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Abstract
This paper provides a critical analysis of  the new operating model for NHS procurement that is being
implemented in 2018/2019 (the NOM). The government expects NOM to generate significant savings
through centralised procurement and strategic supply chain management, which would then be dedicated to
frontline NHS healthcare services through newly devised ‘sustainability and transformation plans’ (STPs).
The paper stresses that the NOM rests on a complex network of  contracts resulting in a layer of
contractualised governance that obscures its architecture and decision-making processes. It maps the changes that
the NOM introduces in the operation and governance of  the NHS supply chain and identifies key challenges
in ensuring that the NOM is subjected to adequate oversight and accountability mechanisms, in particular from
the perspective of  public procurement and competition law. The paper advocates for the location of  all NOM
relationships on the NHS Business Services Authority, especially to facilitate judicial review.
Keywords: NHS; procurement; centralisation; supply chain; efficiency; savings; service
delivery; governance.
JEL codes: H57; H75; I18; K23; K49.
Introduction
Attaining public health goals and satisfying a population’s need for healthcare servicesrequires a complex mix of  governance and delivery structures. States have a wide range
of  choices in the design of  healthcare governance and delivery systems along a continuum
that goes from pure in-house public service management, delivery and governance, to
purely privatised delivery, outsourced management and light-touch public oversight of
healthcare services. In almost any of  these models – with the only exception being
completely self-sufficient systems (which remain a theoretical possibility) – the delivery of
public services requires the acquisition of  goods and equipment from the market through
public procurement. In other words, states do not tend to manufacture the large and diverse
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volumes of  healthcare equipment and consumables (such as diagnostic equipment, test
chemicals or surgical materials, but also simpler products, such as hospital food) that they
require, but rather buy them from the market, and generally from private companies.1 In
that regard, states also have policy choices between, for example, central procurement by a
public authority, decentralised procurement by hospitals, either of  those types of
procurement by private bodies, or an entirely private contracting system subject to public
(i.e. statutory) obligations.
From a governance perspective, each of  these models creates a different balance of
risks and benefits, and mixed systems (which are by and large the majority in developed
economies) are exposed to governance needs and risks that not only involve the public
authorities, bodies and institutions tasked with the delivery of  healthcare services, but
also private providers. As evidenced in recent UK scandals – such as Carillion, Capita,
Southern Cross or G4S2 – governance vulnerabilities derived from private involvement
are increasingly seen as a major flaw of  mixed systems. Contractualised and privatised
systems are also exposed to increased litigation risks, in particular concerning the
tendering of  new contracts – as also evidenced in recent UK experiences, such as the
DHL challenge to the implementation of  the new healthcare procurement system
discussed in this paper.3 All of  this is prompting a reconsideration of  the system
architecture for the delivery of  public services – both in healthcare and in other areas.
More generally, the choice between different system design options is clearly influenced
by the underlying economic model of  a given state’s constitutional settlement, social
preferences, capability and funding constraints, and a number of  other factors – amongst
which free trade agreements and liberalisation efforts are gaining prominence. Economic
efficiency in the expenditure of  public funds for the provision of  healthcare services is
an increasingly important consideration or driver in the (re)design of  healthcare systems.
This has become particularly acute in the post-2008 financial crisis austerity-driven world.
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1     This may be particularly obvious (and sometimes problematic) concerning medicines and other
pharmaceutical products. However, these are not covered by the discussion in this paper, as their acquisition
is subjected to a separate set of  statutory and contractual mechanisms. For background, see NHS Specialist
Pharmacy Service, An Overview of  NHS Procurement of  Medicines and Pharmaceutical Products and Services for Acute
Care in the United Kingdom (22 October 2018) <www.sps.nhs.uk/articles/an-overview-of-nhs-procurement-of-
medicines-and-pharmaceutical-products-and-services-for-acute-care-in-the-united-kingdom>.
2     Carillion may have been the most prominent of  recent scandals, as widely evidenced in the report by the
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees, Carillion (HC 2017–19 769).
However, similar vulnerabilities of  overly reliant privatised and contractualised systems are also evident in the
difficulties resulting from Capita’s mismanagement of  primary care support services; see NAO, NHS England’s
Management of  the Primary Care Support Services Contract with Capita (HC 2017–19 632). The evidence piles up in
other examples concerning Southern Cross’s mismanagement of  nursing and care homes – see e.g. Care
Quality Commission, Report on the Stability of  the Care Market and Market Oversight in England (February 2014)
<www.cqc.org.uk/sites/default/files/201402-market-stability-report.pdf> – or the repeated failings of  G4S
in the area of  security services and prison management, which most recently required a governmental step-
in: see Jessica Elgot, ‘MoJ Seizes Control of  Birmingham Prison from G4S’ The Guardian (London, 20 August
2018) <www.theguardian.com/business/2018/aug/20/moj-seizes-control-of-birmingham-prison-from-
g4s>.
3     This is discussed in more detail below. Suffice it to indicate here that, as the incumbent provider, DHL
challenged the award of  a logistics contract to new entrant Unipart, and this resulted in significant delays in
the implementation of  the new operating model for NHS procurement. See DHL Supply Chain Ltd v Secretary
of  State for Health and Social Care [2018] EWHC 2213 (TCC) (17 August 2018) and Nick Carding, ‘DHSC
awards £730m NHS Logistics Contract Following High Court Victory’ (Health Service Journal, 5 September
2018) <www.hsj.co.uk/finance-and-efficiency/dhsc-awards-730m-nhs-logistics-contract-following-high-
court-victory/7023285.article>.
Indeed, the celebrations of  the 70th anniversary of  the English NHS arrived in 2018
after a decade of  funding cuts and austerity policies, coupled with constant
experimentation in the re-regulation of  the market-based governance mechanisms that
had been employed since the creation of  the ‘NHS internal market’ in the 1990s. The
most recent effort to re-regulate the governance of  the NHS concentrates on the
implementation of  rather ambitious sustainability and transformation plans (STPs),
which could be seen as the first step towards putting an end to the NHS internal market
and reconstructing mechanisms of  public governance and oversight, albeit through the
conduit of  newly created ‘integrated care systems’.4 The purpose of  this paper is not to
assess the STPs, but rather to concentrate on flanking policies aimed at liberating public
funds already dedicated to healthcare services that can then fund the ambitions of  the
STPs (or whichever NHS re-regulation strategy replaces them in the future). In particular,
this paper concentrates on recent efforts to achieve savings in the expenditure of  NHS
funds in the acquisition of  the medical equipment, consumables and services required for
the provision of  healthcare services. As one of  the biggest publicly funded healthcare
systems in the world, the NHS has a non-pay expenditure of  approximately £27 billion a
year, of  which nearly £6 billion is spent on goods (everyday hospital consumables, high-
cost devices, capital equipment and common goods). Achieving savings, even relatively
small ones, on such a large volume of  expenditure could liberate significant funds that
could be reallocated to frontline delivery.
The most recent wave of  efficiency-seeking re-regulation of  NHS procurement
through the so-called Procurement Transformation Plan (PTP), and the resulting New
Operating Model (NOM), pivots around the exercise of  public buying power through
aggregation of  demand and, in particular, through the centralisation of  procurement and
the streamlining of  supply chain management. Interestingly, these strategies are
channelled through entirely privatised (or contractualised) structures that take the
procurement function away from NHS trusts and grants significant decision-making
powers to non-statutory bodies and private entities – which creates a high level of  opacity
of  both the architecture and the governance of  NHS procurement under the NOM.
While theoretically capable of  delivering significant cost efficiencies, these reforms also
create significant implementation and governance challenges. This could shield important
decision-making processes from adequate mechanisms of  control, in particular through
judicial review, and result in a circumvention or watering-down of  significant constraints,
such as those derived from public procurement and competition law.
After providing an overview of  the recent reforms of  the NHS market-based
governance through the STPs to contextualise the discussion, this paper critically analyses
how the NHS is trying to take advantage of  centralised procurement and supply chain
management strategies through the NOM; and how this strategy triggers governance and
legal compliance challenges, in particular from the perspective of  public procurement and
competition law. 
Abandoning the ‘NHS internal market’? Recent NHS governance reforms
In England, economic efficiency, value for money or savings in healthcare expenditure
(however one wants to label it) has been the main driving factor behind the constant
transformation of  the governance and public/private boundaries of  the NHS over the
last three decades. These reforms have sought to rely on market-based governance
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4     Note that these were initially labelled as ‘accountable care systems’, and they may appear as such in NHS
documents cited in this paper. For more details, see NHS, ‘Integrated Care Systems’ (undated)
<www.england.nhs.uk/integratedcare/integrated-care-systems>.
structures to unlock economic efficiency and high-powered incentives for the generation
of  ever-increasing savings in healthcare expenditure. This has taken place in different
waves, starting with the creation of  the ‘NHS internal market’ on 1 April 1991.5 Indeed,
since the 1990s, in England, the activities of  the NHS have been characterised by a rather
distinctive purchaser–provider split whereby some branches of  the NHS act as purchasers
or commissioners of  healthcare services (currently, clinical commissioning groups, or
CCGs), while other branches of  the NHS (trusts and foundation trusts) act as providers
of  healthcare services and compete with private providers in some markets. The
commissioning of  services within the NHS internal market is subject to special rules that
seek to further the patients’ interest.6 The activities of  these entities in such quasi-markets
for healthcare services are overseen by NHS Improvement as sector regulator.
The purchaser–provider split policy was introduced with the aim of  creating an ‘NHS
internal market’ to generate competition-based incentives for the improvement of  service
delivery and cost management.7 However, the system has been permanently evolving (or
in a ‘continuous revolution’),8 and this has both created increased scope for public–
private competition9 and notable difficulties in keeping pace with the successive waves of
NHS re-regulation. Most recently, government policy has shifted towards a roll-back or
undoing of  the NHS internal market.10 Since the adoption in 2014 of  the Five Years
Forward View for the NHS in England,11 the system has been progressively reoriented.
Current reforms are geared towards experimentation with the so-called STPs, which aim
to suppress the purchaser–provider split and bring about integrated funding and delivery
for a given geographical population through integrated care systems.12
However, important elements of  the STP strategy are still unclear and there are open
questions concerning its feasibility and/or desirability.13 The National Audit Office
(NAO) has already warned that the ‘partnerships’ effectiveness varies and their tight
financial positions make it difficult for them to shift focus from short-term day-to-day
pressures to delivering transformation of  services’, which led it to estimate that the
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5     Ray Robinson, ‘The Impact of  the NHS Reforms 1991–1995: A Review of  Research Evidence’ (1996) 18(3)
Journal of  Public Health Medicine 337.
6     For discussion, see Albert Sanchez-Graells, ‘New Rules for Health Care Procurement in the UK. A Critical
Assessment from the Perspective of  EU Economic Law’ (2015) 24(1) Public Procurement Law Review 16.
7     For discussion, see Barbara Ann Allen, Elizabeth Wade and Helen Dickinson, ‘Bridging the Divide –
Commercial Procurement and Supply Chain Management: Are There Lessons for Health Care
Commissioning in England?’ (2009) 9 Journal of  Public Procurement 505.
8     Alan Maynard, in ‘Should the NHS Abolish the Purchaser–Provider Split?’ (British Medical Journal, 12 July 2016)
<https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.i3825>.
9     Okeoghene Odudu, ‘Competition Law and the National Health Service’ (Competition Bulletin, 8 October 2012)
<https://competitionbulletin.com/2012/10/08/competition-law-and-the-national-health-service>; David J
Hunter, ‘Does the NHS still Reside in a Grey Area for EU Competition Law?’ (UKiCE blog, 6 April 2016)
<http://ukandeu.ac.uk/does-the-nhs-still-reside-in-a-grey-area-for-eu-competition-law>.
10   ‘Is this the End of  the NHS’s Internal Market?’ (Economist, 2 November 2017)
<www.economist.com/britain/2017/11/02/is-this-the-end-of-the-nhss-internal-market>.
11   NHS England, ‘NHS Five Year Forward View’ (22 October 2014) <www.england.nhs.uk/publication/nhs-
five-year-forward-view>.
12   This has not changed after the adoption of  the NHS, see <www.longtermplan.nhs.uk>. For discussion on
current STP implementation, see Public Accounts Committee, Oral Evidence: Integrated Health and Social Care
(HC 2016–17 959) Q93. For discussion, see Allyson Pollock and Peter Roderick, ‘Why We should be
Concerned about Accountable Care Organisations in England’s NHS’ (British Medical Journal, 30 January 2018)
<https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.k343>.
13   David Hare, ‘The End of  the Purchaser/Provider Split?’ (NHS Confederation, 14 March 2017)
<www.nhsconfed.org/blog/2017/03/the-end-of-the-purchaser-provider-split>.
implementation of  STPs’ plans would require £10 billion of  extra capital.14 This issue
had significant salience in the 2017 general election, with both the Conservative15 and the
Labour16 manifestos pledging more funding for the NHS and alluding to a change of
system. Despite renewed pledges for additional NHS funding made by the current
Conservative government on the occasion of  the NHS’s 70th anniversary17 – and even if
there was a change of  government and Labour implemented its own view for the future
of  the NHS18 – the transformation or abandonment of  the NHS internal market will
require further additional funding. 
Seeking savings to support the transformation: NHS procurement in the spotlight
At this juncture, it is worth stressing that, regardless of  the way in which the NHS is
internally managed – i.e. with or without the NHS internal market – the provision of
public healthcare services requires and will continue to require the acquisition of  supplies
and services from the market. That is, even in the absence of  the NHS internal market,
the provision of  healthcare services by the NHS will continue to require an interaction
with the (broader/external) market through the acquisition of  goods and services.
Indeed, NHS providers do not produce all equipment, consumables and services needed
for the provision of  healthcare to the general population and they will continue buying
them from the market in the future. Therefore, ‘doing more with less’, or seeking savings
in NHS procurement seems one way (or the only way, if  further savings in workforce are no
longer sought)19 of  freeing up additional funds for the transformation of  the NHS
without (significantly) increasing overall healthcare expenditure. Put simply, seeking ‘more
bang for your pound’ becomes one (or the) main goal in NHS procurement governance.
This realisation materialised in a particularly acute manner in 2012, when the
Department of  Health and Social Care identified scope for the NHS to save at least £1.2
billion through improved NHS procurement20 – which doubled the previous estimate of
£500 million by the NAO,21 and would have required NHS trusts to find over £1.5 billion
of  procurement efficiencies over the three years following the 2013 NHS England
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14   NAO, Sustainability and Transformation in the NHS (HC 2017–19 719).
15   Conservative Unionist Party Manifesto 2017 <https://s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/conservative-party-
manifestos/Forward+Together+-+Our+Plan+for+a+Stronger+Britain+and+a+More+Prosperous....pdf>.
The relevant pledge was to ‘consult and make the necessary legislative changes. This includes the NHS’s own
internal market, which can fail to act in the interests of  patients and creates costly bureaucracy. So we will
review [its] operation . . . and, in time for . . . the 2018 financial year, we will make non-legislative changes to
remove barriers to the integration of  care’ (at 67).
16   Labour Party Manifesto 2017 <https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/labour-manifesto-
2017.pdf>. The relevant pledge was to ‘reverse privatisation of  our NHS and return our health service into
expert public control [including the] repeal [of] the Health and Social Care Act . . . and [making] the NHS the
preferred provider’ (69). 
17   Denis Campbell, ‘Theresa May Pledges to Accelerate NHS Long-term Funding Plan’ The Guardian (London,
27 March 2018) <www.theguardian.com/society/2018/mar/27/theresa-may-pledges-to-accelerate-nhs-long-
term-funding-plan>.
18   Jessica Elgot, ‘Labour Consults on Plan for Major NHS Restructuring’ The Guardian (London, 2 June 2018)
<www.theguardian.com/society/2018/jun/02/labour-consults-on-plan-for-major-nhs-restructuring>.
19   Haroon Siddique, ‘NHS to Receive £487m Technology Boost. Matt Hancock Lists Top Three Priorities as
Tech, Workforce and Illness Prevention’ The Guardian (London, 20 July 2018)
<www.theguardian.com/society/2018/jul/20/nhs-to-receive-487m-technology-boost-matt-hancock>.
20   Department of  Health and Social Care, ‘NHS Procurement: Raising our Game’ (28 May 2012)
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/nhs-procurement-raising-our-game>.
21   NAO, The Procurement of  Consumables by NHS Acute and Foundation Trusts (HC 2010–11 705).
Procurement Development Programme.22 Even if  of  a smaller magnitude, the potential
for significant savings in NHS procurement was later confirmed in 2016 by the Carter
Review,23 which estimated potential NHS procurement savings resulting from reduced
variation across NHS trusts of  at least £700 million. 
All of  these studies and estimates pointed at the potential economic savings derived
from a more homogeneous, streamlined selection of  supplies and suppliers to the NHS
(i.e. reduced variation) and a more strategic exercise of  NHS buying and negotiating
power vis-à-vis its main suppliers (which was expected to lead to cost reductions and/or
increased quality, depending on the relevant goods and services). On the whole, the
realisation that there were (and still are) efficiencies to be had in NHS procurement
resulted in the launch of  the PTP and its current goal for the NHS to deliver £700 million
in savings from improving procurement by the end of  the financial year 2020/2021,24
reaching £2.4 billion savings delivered by the end of  2022/2023,25 and for the NOM to
result in end-state annual savings of  £615 million in real terms from 2022/2023
onwards.26 These estimates and expectations of  savings need to be taken with appropriate
caution, as other complex NHS transformation programmes have resulted in significant
problems that limited or wiped out any expected efficiencies.27 Government assessments
in this area have often focused on the demand-side and assumed that NHS bargaining
power is infinite, so that it is just a matter of  applying it better. However, it is clear that
(at least) in some areas there will also be supplier bargaining power, and efforts by the
NHS to achieve lower prices (on average) will be resisted by suppliers. Thus, these
estimates and projections need to be taken with a pinch of  salt. However, the purpose of
this paper is not to challenge these savings estimates, but rather to critically assess the
legality and governability of  the structures that are being put in place to unlock them.
It is thus worth zooming in on the fact that the Department of  Health and Social Care
expects the NHS to achieve these savings through procurement centralisation and a more strategic
supply chain management.28 This is not a new goal, but rather a revamp of  a strategy that
already underpinned the creation in 2005 of  the NHS Business Services Authority – an
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22   Department of  Health/NHS England, ‘Better Procurement, Better Value, Better Care: A Procurement
Development Programme for the NHS’ (5 August 2013)
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/improving-procurement-in-the-nhs>.
23   Lord Carter of  Coles, Independent Report for the Department of  Health on Operational Productivity and Performance in
English NHS Acute Hospitals: Unwarranted Variations (February 2016)
<www.gov.uk/government/publications/productivity-in-nhs-hospitals>. See also Will Green, ‘Procurement
Can Deliver £1 billion of  NHS Savings a Year, says Lord Carter’ (Supply Management, 11 June 2015)
<www.cips.org/supply-management/news/2015/june/procurement-can-deliver-1-billion-of-nhs-savings-a-
year-says-lord-carter>.
24   This is a rather ambitious goal, the feasibility of  which has been doubted. See e.g. Richard McIntosh, ‘The
Carter Report – Can NHS Procurement Transformation be Accelerated?’ (Health Service Journal, 7 March 2016)
<www.hs j . co.uk/comment/the-car ter- repor t - -can-nhs-procurement- t ransformat ion-be-
accelerated/7003033.article>.
25   NHS Supply Chain, ‘SCCL News: Supply Chain Coordination Limited of  NHS Supply Chain’ (2018)
<www.supplychain.nhs.uk/sccl>.
26   NHS Procurement Transformation Programme, ‘Future Operating Model (FOM) Handbook’ (Issue 1:
October 2017) (hereinafter, the ‘FOM Handbook’)
<www.supplychain.nhs.uk/icc/~/media/Files/News/FOM_HANDBOOK%20Oct%202017.ashx> .
27   See NAO (n 2).
28   For an overview of  the evolution of  NHS procurement structures up to 2015, see Joe Sanderson et al,
‘Towards a Framework for Enhancing Procurement and Supply Chain Management Practice in the NHS:
Lessons for Managers and Clinicians from a Synthesis of  the Theoretical and Empirical Literature’ (2015) 18
Health Services and Delivery Research 3 <www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK286079>.
executive non-departmental public body (NDPB) of  the Department of  Health and
Social Care that provides some support services to the NHS in England and Wales.29 At
the same time, there was a reorganisation of  the NHS Logistics Authority and parts of
the NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency (PASA), which became part of  what is known
as the NHS Supply Chain.30 NHS Supply Chain is not a separate entity or body, but rather
a logistics management unit under the umbrella of  the NHS Business Services Authority,
currently operated by the private company DHL (DHL Supply Chain Ltd) under a long-
term outsourcing contract. NHS Supply Chain does not have separate legal personality,
but is rather a front or holding place for the underlying contract for logistical and other
services. However, this is not necessarily observable in all or most interactions with third
parties, as NHS Supply Chain externally presents itself  as an ‘organisation’.31 Figure 1
provides a schematic representation of  the relationships between these entities.
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29   NHS Business Services Authority <www.nhsbsa.nhs.uk>.
30   NHS Supply Chain, ‘What We Do’ <www.supplychain.nhs.uk/about-us/what-we-do>.
31   See e.g. its website <www.supplychain.nhs.uk>.
32   FOM Handbook (n 26).
Figure 1: NHS supply chain governance 
Source: own elaboration
NHS Supply Chain provides centralised procurement services to the NHS. It manages
framework contracts and other contractual mechanisms that allow direct access to
suppliers by NHS procurers. NHS Supply Chain is thus a procurement intermediary for
NHS trusts (and the ‘NHS family’ more generally) that has generated savings through
aggregation of  purchasing needs and professionalisation of  the management of  the NHS
supply chain. After the Carter Review, NHS Supply Chain became the focal point of  the
Department of  Health and Social Care’s Future Operating Model for NHS Procurement (the
FOM, which has now become the NOM),32 which it expects to ‘flex the tremendous
buying power of  the NHS to unlock annual savings of  £615 million’, and with which it
seeks to ‘make a major contribution to healthcare efficiency’. The transition towards the
NOM was foreseen as a staged process. A first stage involved streamlining the existing
work of  NHS Supply Chain, as well as launching pilot programmes for the centralised
acquisition of  standard supplies. A second stage would involve the roll-out of  a
significantly changed supply chain structure managed by NHS Supply Chain (as described
in the next section). In April 2016, the NHS PTP resulted in the introduction of  the
High-Cost Tariff-Excluded Devices (HCTED) programme, a new nationwide system for
purchasing high-cost medical devices and implants used in specialised services.33 The
HCTED system concerns centralised collaborative procurement between NHS Supply
Chain and designated NHS trust champions for different device categories. Similarly, in
early 2017, a further centralisation programme was launched: the NHS Nationally
Contracted Products (NCP) programme,34 which is an NHS Supply Chain initiative that
aggregates national demand for selected standardised products to purchase them on
behalf  of  the whole of  the NHS in order to optimise value and deliver savings. Both
programmes served as stepping stones towards the NOM. The HCTED programme will
be fully incorporated into the NOM, as part of  the new NHS Supply Chain, while the
NCP was effectively adopted as an interim measure to establish principles and working
practices in advance of  the NOM.
The streamlining of  NHS Supply Chain activities and the implementation of  the NCP
were expected to unlock significant savings (c. £300mn) by October 2018,35 when the
current contract with DHL would have expired and the NOM would be fully operational.
It was also expected that the HCTED would see savings of  over £60 million reinvested
into specialist care in its first two years. However, migration into the NOM’s second (or
fully operational) stage has seen some delays, in particular concerning the award of  the
NOM logistics contract – which has been the object of  a legal challenge by DHL, which
opposed the award of  the contract to a different operator (Unipart).36 In order to bridge
the transition in to NOM, the pre-PTP contract with DHL was extended until
28 February 2019. After the High Court dismissed DHL’s challenge,37 the NOM is now
expected to become (fully) operational in March 2019. These delays suggest a more
limited (or at least a slower) unlocking of  savings than initially anticipated,38 and an
extended period of  implementation of  the NOM, or at least some of  its aspects. The
Department of  Health and Social Care, however, remains committed to the NOM.
Centralisation of NHS procurement and supply chain management: the NOM
Collaborative and centralised procurement strategies have progressively been
implemented in the NHS over the last decade or so.39 This has resulted in savings through
reduced unit costs for standard equipment and supplies,40 and reoriented non-pay
expenditure by NHS trusts to new channels. NHS procurement expenditure is currently
roughly split across three procurement routes: 20 per cent direct expenditure by NHS
trusts, 40 per cent expenditure through ad hoc collaborative procurement in NHS hubs,
and 40 per cent expenditure through centralised mechanisms managed as ‘consolidated
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 70(1)60
33   NHS England, ‘New System for Buying and Supplying High-cost Medical Devices in Specialised Services’
<www.england.nhs.uk/commissioning/spec-services/key-docs/medical-devices>.
34   NHS Supply Chain, ‘Nationally Contracted Products’ <www.supplychain.nhs.uk/savings/nationally-
contracted-products>.
35   NHS Business Services Authority, ‘Strategy 2017–22’ (May 2017)
<www.nhsbsa.nhs.uk/sites/default/files/2017-05/nhsbsa-strategy-2017-2022.pdf>.
36   See above (n 3).
37   Ibid.
38   Peter Smith, ‘Delays to NHS Future Operating Model Supply Chain Contracts’ (Spend Matters UK/Europe, 12
April 2018) <https://spendmatters.com/uk/delays-to-nhs-future-operating-model-supply-chain-contracts>.
39   This is reflective of  a broader trend of  procurement centralisation across government, which, however, still
requires significant improvement. For an early assessment, see NAO, Improving Government Procurement (HC
2012–13 996).
40   See e.g. NHS Supply Chain, ‘£250 Million Cash Releasing Savings Achieved for the NHS’ (26 October 2017)
<www.supplychain.nhs.uk/news/press-releases/2017/250-million-cash-releasing-savings-achieved>.
procurement’ by NHS Supply Chain.41 The PTP strategy is to further centralise
procurement in order to leverage the NHS’s buying power in the expenditure of  the c.
£6 billion a year in goods and services. This requires a redesign of  a new NHS Supply
Chain.42 The current plan is to progressively migrate towards the NOM, so that by
2023/2024 the proportion of  consolidated procurement doubles, from 40 per cent to
80 per cent.43 Such a significant increase in consolidated expenditure will in principle
reduce the scope for both direct procurement by NHS trusts and for collaborative
procurement through NHS hubs, although some hubs have indicated that they will
continue to seek collaboration in areas of  NHS non-pay expenditure not covered by the
NOM.44
In a somehow simplified manner, the NOM can be conceptualised as a network of
contracts enabling a different work system for the NHS Supply Chain. The NOM
comprises 14 separate contracts let to organisations that will manage the service for an
initial period of  three years (although delays have already been incurred, in particular
concerning the logistics contract, as mentioned above), with potential contract extensions
based on meeting performance targets. The NOM has been launched on the basis of  a
commercial arrangement that allows contractors to obtain profit margins in their supplies
or provision of  services, which is the way in which NHS Supply Chain has been funded
until now. Differently, however, the NOM will be centrally funded from 1 April 2019, in
what has been described as a ‘top slicing’, which should facilitate the application of
pricing and tariff  structures designed through the normal tariff  consultation processes
run by NHS England and NHS Improvement. However, it is worth stressing that
centrally funding the cost of  the new system will require further reallocation of  NHS
funds within the ‘NHS family’. In fact, the central funding of  the NOM will be drawn
from funds currently allocated to NHS trusts,45 which will force the latter to use the
system (and thus benefit from its expected savings) or else have to find other sources of
efficiencies to compensate for their reduced funding. Crucially, if  the NOM fails to
deliver procurement-related savings commensurate to (at least) the cost of  its central
funding, the implementation of  the system will result in yet one more source of  erosion
of  funding for frontline NHS services – which is the opposite of  what it sets out to
achieve. Given current delays and foreseeable implementation difficulties, it is not out of
the question that the implementation of  the NOM will result in a negative financial
impact for English NHS trusts, at least in the short run. This comes to put additional
pressure on the NOM to deliver financial savings quickly, which may also affect the way
some important decisions are made. This can only reaffirm the importance of  gaining a
better understanding of  the checks and balances in the system, and the reviewability of
the decisions adopted by NOM-agents, which is the focus of  the remainder of  this paper.
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41   FOM Handbook (n 26) 8.
42   Note that NHS Supply Chain has relabelled the initially described as FOM (future operating model) as the
NOM (new operating model). In order to provide updated discussion, the paper refers to the NOM. However,
please note that most materials referred to in the footnotes still use the FOM.
43   Department of  Health and Social Care, ‘Procurement Transformation Programme: Future Operating Model’
(December 2016) <www.abhi.org.uk/media/1288/procurement_transformation_programme_brief_fom_
brief__131216-1.pdf>.
44   Presentation given by Keith Rowley, Managing Director, North of  England Commercial Procurement
Collaborative, at the ‘Procurement4Health’ 2018 Conference on 12 July 2018.
45   Nick Carding, ‘Half  a Billion Pounds to be Withheld from Trusts over Two Years’ (Health Service Journal, 22
August 2018) <www.hsj.co.uk/finance-and-efficiency/half-a-billion-pounds-to-be-withheld-from-trusts-over-
two-years/7023189.article>.
Figure 2 represents the general architecture of  the NOM, which adopts a ‘tower’
structure around cross-cutting horizontal services and vertical procurement ‘category
towers’ for different types of  medical, capital and non-medical goods and services.
The NOM thus initially comprised contracts for: 
(a) 11 ‘category tower’ service providers (consisting of  buying teams focused on
specific product categories); 
(b) logistics; 
(c) transactional services (although these have been finally internalised by the
NHS Business Services Authority);47 and 
(d) IT services.48
Figure 3 identifies the category towers and the providers of  those and other services
as of  the time of  writing.
The oversight and operational management of  the new NOM contracts and services
along with customer engagement activities will be delivered by a new organisation known
as the Intelligent Client Coordinator (ICC). The ICC contract has been entrusted to
Supply Chain Coordination Ltd (SCCL), a subsidiary company set up by the Department
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46   NHS Supply Chain, ‘New Operating Model – Frequently Asked Questions’ (28 June 2018)
<www.supplychain.nhs.uk/icc/~/media/Files/News/NHS%20SC%20Customer%20FAQs%20280618.ashx>.
47   Presentation given by Chris Holmes, Supply Chain Director, Supply Chain Coordination Ltd, at the
‘Procurement4Health’ 2018 Conference on 12 July 2018.
48   The extent to which transactional and IT services beyond the NOM’s internal needs form part of  the tower
system is unclear. See e.g. the recent tender of  a large value contract by NHS Shared Business Services:
‘Salford: Hospital and Related Services’ (2018/S 143–327281)
<https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:327281-2018:TEXT:EN:HTML&WT.mc_id=RSS-
Feed&WT.rss_f=Other+Services&WT.rss_a=327281-2018&WT.rss_ev=a >.
Figure 2: NOM structure
Source: NHS Supply Chain46
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of  Health and Social Care and registered in Companies House. However, SCCL is
described as a public sector organisation that forms part of  the ‘NHS family’ tasked with
rationalising and simplifying the procurement landscape and improving responsiveness to
NHS organisations. SCCL is seen as providing a vital role in the clinical and product
assurance (CaPA) of  the NOM. In that regard, SCCL will help the category tower service
providers (the CTSPs) to ensure that, where necessary, products are clinically evaluated.
The aim is that all products will go through a product assurance over a 4–5 year rolling
period.
THE KEY ROLE GIVEN TO CTSPS
Functionally, then, the key difference between the current NHS Supply Chain system and
the NOM is the significant active role given to the CTSPs in developing category
management strategies (that is, the ‘go to market approach’ at product level). Every CTSP
sourcing strategy has to go through the newly created SCCL Category Council for
approval.50 Once approved by the SCCL Category Council, the CTSPs’ category
management strategies determine the approach to the procurement of  the equipment,
consumable and/or services included in the relevant category by practically the entirety
of  the NHS. Their role is described as comprising ‘the clinical evaluation of  products and
[running] procurement processes on behalf  of  the NHS. These providers will use
category management techniques to create strategies that sustainably provide the NHS
with clinically assured products at the best value’.51
Under the NOM structure, CTSPs are incentivised to reduce total cost in the system,
not just reduce unit prices of  the goods and services covered by the relevant category.
They hold Guaranteed Maximum Price Target Cost (GMPTC) contracts, under which
CTSPs will be paid the operational costs incurred in performing the services against an
annual target set out in the contract, but will only make a profit when savings are
delivered, on a gainshare basis that is capped.52 This is seen as creating adequate
incentives for overall cost reduction through system-wide savings – and is probably the
justification for the centralised funding of  the NOM, which seems based on the premise
that those who are bound to benefit from its generated savings (i.e. NHS trusts) should
bear the financial cost of  the new procurement infrastructure. It is also worth noting that
CTSPs will be taking on the operational responsibility of  the relevant category tower
from the current NHS Supply Chain, and that they are also bound to absorb, where
possible, existing procurement team staff  from NHS Supply Chain under TUPE. On the
whole, then, it seems that NOM is largely a restructuring of  the current NHS Supply
Chain by means of  a spin-off  of  general tasks to the newly created SCCL and a transfer
of  branches of  activity to NOM contractors through the CTSP contracts, as well as a
reallocation of  financial risks to NHS trusts (despite the contrary appearance resulting
from centralised funding).
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50   Apparently, more than 50 category strategies went through the Category Council approval process before the
end of  July 2018. Presentation given by Jo Gander, CaPA Director, Supply Chain Coordination Ltd, at the
‘Procurement4Health’ 2018 Conference on 12 July 2018.
51   Department of  Health and Social Care, ‘Procurement Transformation Programme. Future Operating Model.
Frequently Asked Questions for Suppliers’ (5 January 2018)
<www.supplychain.nhs.uk/Home/News/~/media/Files/News/DH%20FOM%20%20Supplier%20QA%2
0%20FINAL.ashx>.
52   The contracts are described as establishing efficiency-generating incentives via key performance indicators
(KPIs) and intangible system cost changes, which not only determine the possibility for CTSPs to share in the
gains of  significant savings, but also the application of  performance management measures. Indeed, CTSPs
will be withheld payment if  they do not achieve 50% of  the relevant KPIs, and will be put on notice of  critical
service failure if  they do not achieve at least 80% of  the relevant KPIs.
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From a governance perspective, crucially, as a result of  the NOM structure, CTSPs
are not the direct providers of  the equipment, consumables or services required under
each of  the category towers, but rather intermediaries, consultants or advisors (or a
hybrid of  these functions) that will design and set up additional contractual mechanisms
(implicitly, in the form of  framework agreements or dynamic purchasing systems,
probably underpinned by electronic catalogues) with third parties on behalf  of the NHS.
CTSPs then take the place of  the current NHS Supply Chain in the provision of
centralised purchasing services. However, given that not all CTSPs are part of  the ‘NHS
family’ and that their relationship with the new NHS Supply Chain (and in particular
SCCL as the ICC) is purely contractual, understanding the exact fit of  the CTSP–(user)
NHS trust relationship within existing English public law structures will be challenging
(as discussed below). Indeed, one of  the implicit changes in the move towards the NOM
is a potential de facto loss of  accountability and reviewability of  key decisions in the
operation of  the NHS supply chain, which is now heavily dependent on the CTSPs. From
a functional perspective, it seems that the NOM has created an additional layer of
contractualised governance, the effectiveness of  which will depend on its interaction with
other layers of  additional regulation, both upstream (i.e. NHS trust and ‘NHS-family’
structures) and downstream (procurement and commercial contracts). It has also created
an additional layer of  potential conflicts of  interest that will raise equally peculiar
challenges (which are discussed below).
Lights and shadows of the NOM
It is of  course still too early to assess the practical impacts of  the NOM and the extent
to which it will deliver the expected savings and efficiencies that have been used to justify
setting it up – although harbouring doubts about their (timely) materialisation does not
seem unjustified. Be that as it may, the NOM’s structural and functional design raises
important questions.53 Some of  these questions concern the extent to which the NOM
truly generates a different way of  working and a more strategic approach than the
previous mechanisms for collaborative and centralised NHS procurement. Other
questions arise in the context of  the subjection of  NHS expenditure through the NOM
to public procurement and competition law requirements. Before assessing the latter (in
the next section), it is worth reflecting on some of  the strategic issues. Looking at the list
of  NOM-contract holders (above, Figure 3), it becomes evident that there are two
contractors that accumulate a significant number of  contracts: DHL (through DHL Life
Sciences and Healthcare UK) and the Collaborative Procurement Partnership LLP (which
is made up the four NHS procurement hubs: NHS Commercial Solutions; NHS London
Procurement Partnership NHS; East of  England NHS Collaborative Procurement Hub;
and the North of  England Commercial Procurement Collaborative – the latter also
holding an additional NOM contract in its own name). It is also worth noting that the
largest public sector central purchasing body, the Crown Commercial Service, also holds
a NOM contract. This raises two important issues.
First, that the NOM may represent a smaller transition from decentralised towards
centralised procurement than it may at first appear. Given that the four pre-existing NHS
procurement hubs have partnered together and received major NOM contracts, there may
be a displacement rather than a substitution effect between hub-based and NOM-based
NHS procurement. In that regard, given that the current level of  hub-channelled
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53   See e.g. Rob Knott, ‘The Future of  NHS Procurement? Look into your Procurement Strategy, not a Crystal
Ball’ (Health Care Supply Association, nd) <https://nhsprocurement.org.uk/the-future-of-nhs-procurement-
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procurement is 40 per cent and consolidated procurement managed by NHS Supply
Chain is also 40 per cent, the extent to which the 80 per cent of  NOM-related
procurement that should be achieved by 2023/2024 is significantly different from the
current structure raises important questions. To some extent, it would seem that the
NOM could result in rather small incremental changes, which may then be insufficient to
unlock the very significant reductions in costs that are currently anticipated – and thus
result in an undesirable net reduction of  funding for frontline NHS services through the
NHS trusts’ contribution to the central funding of  the NOM. Moreover, there is a risk
of  parallel or competing procurement structures if  there is insufficient coordination
between NOM and hub-based procurement. For example, recent tenders for enteral feed
products and services by individual NHS trusts and regional hubs show that there will be
difficulties in migrating over to the NOM system, as these contracts should have been
procured under NOM category tower 1 since May 2018.54
Second, regarding the accumulation of  contracts in DHL’s hands, a note of  caution
may be needed in view of  very negative recent experiences with other ‘strategic suppliers’
of  outsourced services, such as Carillion55 and Capita.56 Given the clear strategic risks
that result from the accumulation of  large volumes of  complex and delivery-sensitive
services by one (conglomerate) provider, and the ineffectiveness of  the government’s
approach to managing relationships with ‘strategic suppliers’,57 the desirability of  the
NOM strategy may require some additional analysis – in particular from the perspective
of  systemic risks and resilience and continuity of  supply. In a sector where supply
disruption can have negative impacts on population health and human lives, this is not a
minor concern. Recent examples of  failed concentration of  risks in NHS suppliers
provide evidence of  the need for careful analysis of  such vulnerabilities of  highly
concentrated procurement,58 which the NOM can only increase exponentially.
Moreover, even if  it is not its main driver, it is also clear that the NOM aims to
aggregate buying power beyond the ‘NHS family’ by allowing non-NHS organisations to
use the NOM – that is, the NOM would provide procurement and logistics services in the
private market, competing with other providers to the public and private sectors, and non-
NHS NOM users would be subject to a different pricing model depending on whether
they are another public sector organisation or a private company.59 This characterises the
NOM as a commercially orientated strategy rather than a ‘mere’ conduit for the self-
organisation of  the healthcare (public) sector in England. This can have an impact on the
way it is run and on the way in which public interest considerations are embedded in
NOM-related decision-making and governance. The commercial exploitation of  the
NOM can also generate additional risks – e.g. concerning the liability of  the NOM vis-à-
vis commercial clients – complex tax issues, and other considerations – e.g. state aid.
Moreover, the fact that the NOM is open to non-NHS and private organisations raises
important additional issues from both a competition and public procurement law
perspective. All of  this results in a certainly complex set of  legal and governance issues
that require some close analysis.
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54   See e.g. ‘United Kingdom-Sheffield: Enteral Feeds’ (2018/S 123–279618)
<https://ted.europa.eu/TED/notice/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:279618-2018:TEXT:EN:HTML>.
55   Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy and Work and Pensions Committees (n 2).
56   NAO (n 2).
57   NAO, Managing Government Suppliers (HC 2013–14 811).
58   Kat Lay, ‘Aprons Crisis “Threatens NHS Patients and Staff ”’ The Times (London, 20 January 2018)
<www.thetimes.co.uk/article/chinese-plastic-aprons-crisis-threatens-nhs-patients-and-staff-m6s6pxnss>.
59   FOM Frequently Asked Questions (n 51).
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Governance and legal compliance challenges of the NOM
As mentioned in the previous section, the migration towards the NOM creates an
additional layer of  contractualised or privatised management of  the NHS supply chain
that triggers significant governance and legal compliance issues. Figure 4 depicts a
comparison of  alternative procurement routes for medical equipment that provides a
useful framework for the discussion of  these issues. It compares the direct procurement
and supply of  the equipment between the NHS trust and the equipment supplier with a
‘NOM’ supply.
The direct procurement of  medical equipment for its own use by an NHS trust
(depicted to the left of  Figure 4) creates two relatively straightforward legal relationships.
The evident one is a direct contractual relationship with the equipment supplier (1).
Underpinning that, the NHS trust would have been obliged to comply with the applicable
public procurement rules in the tendering of  that contract (2). The first contractual
relationship would be subject to its own terms and any disputes would be directly resolved
or litigated between the parties (or possibly subjected to alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms). Regarding the second legal relationship (procurement), the NHS trust
would have been constrained by the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (PCR2015)60 and
its decisions would have been open to both the system of  procurement-specific remedies
and, potentially, to judicial review.
Conversely, the NOM model of  procurement (depicted to the right of  Figure 4)
creates some analytical challenges. In this case, the procurement architecture is much
more complex, despite the simplified official account that CTSPs will ‘run procurement
processes on behalf  of  the NHS’. This cannot be understood as a simple substitution or
intermediation of  CTSPs for the benefit of  the ultimate ‘client’ contracting authorities (in
the example, the NHS trust). It rather entails a very different approach to the design and
execution of  procurement operations. Indeed, by tendering a framework agreement on
behalf  of  the NHS under the NOM structure, the CTSP would not hold a straightforward
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Figure 4: Changes introduced by NOM supply chain compared to direct procurement
Source: own elaboration
direct procurement relationship (or any explicit procurement relationship at all) with the
equipment supplier (7). The tendering of  the contract would have followed a certain level
of  scrutiny and authorisation by the NOM ICC, namely the SCCL (6), and the framework
agreement would (most likely) have been tendered on the specific behalf  of  NHS Supply
Chain as the relevant contracting authority. However, given that NHS Supply Chain has
no separate legal personality, the standard approach under the current (pre-NOM)
operation of  NHS Supply Chain has been for the latter to act as the agent of  NHS
Business Services Authority (5), which would be the entity ultimately (indirectly) holding
the contract.61 Moreover, it is worth noting that the Secretary of  State for Health has
represented the NHS Business Services Authority in the award of  the main NOM
contracts to CTSPs,62 which can add an additional layer of  complication to the
procurement of  the NOM framework agreements.
The setting-up of  a framework agreement under the NHS Supply Chain umbrella
would then allow an individual NHS trust to place a call-off  for the required medical
equipment without the need for any additional public tender (4).63 The delivery of  the
equipment would then be subject to a direct relationship between the equipment supplier
and the NHS trust (3), which would, however, be strongly influenced by (and dependent
on) the generally applicable clauses of  the framework agreement. It would also be
possible for the NOM-logistics operator to be involved in part of  the implementation of
the call-off, although this is more likely for supplies of  consumables than for supplies of
equipment, in particular if  they require installation. In addition to that, the management
of  this contractual relationship could involve the active participation of  the CTSP (or
potentially SCCL), as part of  the NOM approach to post-sales customer management.
While the contract law implications of  this solution may be easier to resolve through
carefully drafted framework agreements and call-off  contracts, the procurement
dimension of  the NOM creates complications of  a different nature. The extent to which
compliance with the PCR2015 and the effectiveness of  procurement-specific and general
judicial review mechanisms can be ensured requires some careful analysis.
Indeed, the rather complicated NOM structure raises important questions and
challenges from a governance and legal compliance standpoint. It is submitted that there
are four salient issues that require particular attention. First, the classification of  the
activities of  the CTSP on behalf  of the ‘NHS family’ under public law for the purposes of
judicial review. Second, the subjection of  NOM procurement to the PCR2015 and its
implications in terms of  procurement compliance not only by CTSPs, but also by NHS
trusts. Third, the management of  conflicts of  interest in this setting. Last, but not least,
the applicability of  competition law to the NOM structure.
PUBLIC LAW FIT OF CTSP ACTIVITIES ON BEHALF OF THE ‘NHS FAMILY’
One of  the difficulties implicit in the NOM – and, previously, in the management of
important aspects of  NHS governance and delivery through arms-length organisations
and publicly owned commercial entities, such as the NHS Business Services Authority
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61   However, it is worth noting that (some of) the NOM contracts with CTSP have been tendered and entered
into by the NHS Business Services Authority, represented for procurement purposes by the Secretary of  State
for Health. This complicates the picture even further, as discussed in the main text.
62   See ‘United Kingdom-Newcastle upon Tyne: Procurement Consultancy Services’ (2018/S 021–044459)
<https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:44459-2018:TEXT:EN:HTML>.
63   Please note that, depending on the design of  the framework agreement, this could require an additional mini-
competition between the potential providers included in the framework agreement. This would raise
additional procurement issues. However, in order to keep some simplicity in the discussion, it is assumed that
this is a single supplier framework where all call-off  conditions are set at the time of  award.
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and NHS Supply Chain – is the accountability and reviewability of  the decisions of  the
ever-changing ‘NHS family’. If  one wants to challenge a given decision, e.g. subjecting it
to judicial review, one must first be able to answer complex questions about the
attribution to specific authorities or entities of  authority and decision-making powers, as
well as of  the consequences for those decisions. There is a chain of  contractual
arrangements and directions that are relevant in that regard, which interact with 
pre-existing legislative and statutory instruments.
The NHS Business Services Authority has been given statutory functions64 and issued
directions by the Department of  Health and Social Care under the National Health Service
Act 2006 (most recently in 2016)65 in relation to the management of  the NHS supply
chain.66 The Department of  Health and Social Care has also concluded a 2014 framework
agreement with the NHS Business Services Authority that concerns, amongst other things,
the way in which the latter discharges its statutory function by ‘managing a 10-year
outsourced Master Services Agreement (MSA) for the delivery of  supply chain services to
the NHS’.67 The framework agreement makes it clear that the NHS Business Services
Authority acts in accordance with the delegated authority issued to it by the Department
of  Health and Social Care. Therefore, it seems straightforward to conclude that, in the
exercise of  its functions concerning the NHS supply chain and, in particular, in the context
of  the MSA, the NHS Business Services Authority is exercising delegated authority from
the Department of  Health and Social Care – to which, in turn, the acts of  the NHS
Business Services Authority are attributable as those of  its delegate. The MSA to which the
abovementioned delegation refers is the pre-NOM outsourced relationship between NHS
Business Services Authority and DHL (i.e. the current NHS Supply Chain), which was
revised and extended in 2015.68 Under this agreement, DHL (as the outward-facing front
of  the NHS Supply Chain) acts as the agent of  the NHS Business Services Authority69 –
that is, as the agent of  the delegate of  the Department of  Health and Social Care.
The structure of  the NOM suggests that a similar approach may be followed in the
future. Contract opportunities that should be covered by category towers have been
advertised, e.g. by ‘DHL Supply Chain acting on behalf  of  Supply Chain Coordination
Ltd acting on behalf  of  the NHS Business Services Authority’.70 This means that, as a
result of  NOM – or along the process of  transitioning into NOM – there has been a
‘simple’ displacement of  the NHS Business Services Authority, which is now further
removed from the tender of  new contracts and framework agreements through the
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Constitution) Order 2005, SI 2005/2414.
65   NHS Business Services Authority (Awdurdod Gwasanaethau Busnes y GIG) Directions 2016
<www.nhsbsa.nhs.uk/sites/default/files/2017-02/Section_2_-_B1_NHSBSA_Directions_2016.pdf>.
66   Ibid Direction 15 and Schedule 4.
67   The latest version was concluded in August 2014. See Framework Agreement between the Department of
Health and NHS Business Services Authority <www.nhsbsa.nhs.uk/sites/default/files/2017-02/2014-08-
08_-_NHSBSA_Framework_Agreement_2014.pdf>.
68   On file with the author.
69   This is made explicit in relevant notices, such as the standard registration notice of  the NHS Supply Chain
website, which reads ‘NHS Supply Chain is operated by DHL Supply Chain Limited (Company Registration
No: 528867), as agent for the NHS Business Services Authority’ <www.supplychain.nhs.uk>.
70   See ‘United Kingdom-London: Disposable Non-chemical Medical Consumables and Haematological
Consumables’ (2018/S 126–287428) <https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:287428-
2018:TEXT:EN:HTML>. See also ‘United Kingdom-London: Continuous Paper for Computer Printers’
(2018/S 135–307468) <https://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:307468-2018:TEXT:EN:HTML>.
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interposition of  SCCL (the NOM ICC) as a second-tier agent. This suggests the
emergence of  a structure where the Department of  Health and Social Care, despite
holding responsibility for the management of  the supply chain of  the NHS, is now rather
detached from operational decisions, as its own delegate (NHS Business Services Authority)
is two steps away from the operational decisions of  DHL (as the operating part of  NHS
Supply Chain, which will progressively be replaced by the CTSPs and/or the new logistics
operator, Unipart) acting as the agent of  its own agent, the SCCL.
This seems problematic in terms of  establishing responsibility along the chain, in
particular if  one starts from the bottom. It is conceivable that the transparency of  the
chain of  delegation and representation is not always completely clear or visible (in
particular concerning decisions not subjected to procurement transparency notices), and
third parties may not always have a very detailed understanding of  how the different
entities within the ‘NHS family’ relate to each other. Additionally, this structure does not
clarify the position of  the CTSPs. Publicly available information issued by the
Department of  Health and Social Care and the strategic design of  the NOM make it clear
that CTSPs carry out their activities, in particular their procurement activities, on behalf  of
the NHS. However, the legal structure given to those activities (at least the procurement
activities, where CTSPs may not even be mentioned) makes CTSPs practically invisible,
inasmuch as they do not tender and enter into the contracts directly in their own name,
but acting as second-tier agents of  the NHS Business Services Authorities. It thus seems
that CTSPs’ activities are purely advisory and that the entity formally adopting the
decisions is, most likely, NHS Supply Chain or rectius SCCL – which, in both cases,
amounts to imputing the decision to the NHS Business Services Authority. This does not
seem to represent a situation where CTSPs carry out activities on behalf  of the NHS, but
rather where the NHS (Business Services Authority) carries out activities designed or
shaped by CTSPs.71 This can, indeed, liberate CTSPs from a certain degree of
responsibility (and liability) for their decisions, as they will rarely be subject to direct
challenges by third parties and, most likely, will be solely subjected to and accountable
under the specific terms of  relevant NOM contracts (which could include alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms).
This can make it difficult for interested parties to challenge CTSPs’ decisions in
judicial review if  they assume that, (most of) the CTSPs being private or commercial
entities, they are not subjected to the jurisdiction of  the administrative courts – as the
defendant in judicial review cases is presented as ‘the public body/public office which
made the decision under challenge’.72 Moreover, even if  the avenue for judicial review is
identified, this structure can still create a disincentive if, in order to challenge CTSPs’
decisions, affected parties have to bring an action against the NHS Business Services
Authority – which they may not see as directly involved with the decision they wish to
challenge. It may also be difficult to access CTSPs’ internal documents, as the rules on
access to documents and freedom of  information may not be easy to apply in this setting. 
De facto, the NOM structure, and, in particular, the additional layer of  contractualised
relationships between CTSPs and the SCCL (acting as NHS Supply Chain’s ICC and,
ultimately, the agent for the NHS Business Services Authority), results in legal uncertainty.
In order to avoid seeing their challenges set aside for procedural reasons, it seems that the
NOM structure most likely requires third parties to address their complaints simultaneously
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71   This could, for example, make rather challenging the application of  precedent concerning the judicial review
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72   The Administrative Court Judicial Review Guide 2018 (July 2018) para 2.2.2.1.
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or globally against all entities in the chain (including CTSPs, and possibly all the way up to
the Secretary of  State for Health) due to the uncertainty that the attribution of  decision-
making powers, authority and legal liability creates. This can hardly be seen as a desirable
state of  affairs from the perspective of  public accountability and judicial review.
SUBJECTION TO AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE PCR2015
The uncertainty derived from the NOM structure not only affects third parties, but also
internal NHS users. Indeed, NHS trusts (and any other contracting authorities within the
‘NHS family’) have an interest in understanding exactly who holds relevant contractual
arrangements under NOM and where do the public/private boundaries lie. NHS trusts
qualify as contracting authorities under EU and UK public procurement law and are thus
subject to a direct obligation to tender the contracts for acquisitions and supplies above
certain value thresholds. One of  the advantages of  the NOM is that it allows NHS trusts
to dispense with those tendering obligations on the basis that acquisitions within the
‘NOM system’ ensure indirect compliance with the relevant obligations. However, this
possibility of  indirect compliance is not unqualified.
Under the current rules, a ‘user’ contracting authority (such as an NHS trust) fulfils
its obligations under the PCR2015 when it acquires supplies or services from a ‘central
purchasing body’ (CPB) or using contractual mechanisms concluded by a CPB (reg 37(4)
and (5) PCR2015). For these purposes, a ‘central purchasing body’ means a contracting
authority which provides centralised purchasing activities (reg 2(1) PCR2015). This is
relevant in two respects. First, where an NHS trust acquires from or through a CPB it
does not face independent liability for breach of  the procurement rules – unless it directly
carries out additional selection activities (‘mini-competitions’) on top of  the more basic
(or open-ended) CPB procurement activities (cf  reg 37(6) PCR2015). This applies even if
the CPB has not adequately complied with the relevant rules in the tendering of  the
underlying contracts. The assumption here is that CPBs will comply with the relevant
rules and that, where they do not comply, they will be directly exposed to challenges.
Second, for this mechanism of  indirect compliance to apply, the acquisition needs to be
from or through contractual mechanisms established by a CPB that is a contracting authority.
‘Contracting authorities’ are in turn defined (reg 2(1) PCR2015). In addition to the state,
regional and local authorities, this includes ‘bodies governed by public law’. The latter are
defined as:
bodies that have all of  the following characteristics: – 
(a) they are established for the specific purpose of  meeting needs in the general interest,
not having an industrial or commercial character;
(b) they have legal personality; and
(c) they have any of  the following characteristics: – 
(i) they are financed, for the most part, by the State, regional or local authorities, or
by other bodies governed by public law;
(ii) they are subject to management supervision by those authorities or bodies; or
(iii) they have an administrative, managerial or supervisory board, more than half  of
whose members are appointed by the State, regional or local authorities, or by
other bodies governed by public law;
The assessment of  whether the NOM architecture complies with these conditions and
can, thus, be considered as enabling indirect compliance with the relevant procurement
rules under the CPB regime requires, first and foremost, locating the analysis in a given
entity along the NOM chain. If  the entities holding NOM contracts and framework
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agreements tendered on behalf  of  the NHS were the CTSPs themselves or even the SCCL, it
would seem clear that this exemption would not be applicable – as they are operating as
commercial entities. However, we have seen above that the contracts are tendered by
DHL (or, in the immediate future, perhaps the relevant CTSP) ‘acting on behalf  of
Supply Chain Coordination Ltd acting on behalf  of  the NHS Business Services
Authority’. This seems to (legally) allocate the contract to the NHS Business Services
Authority. If  this is the correct interpretation, then the legality of  this mechanism from a
procurement perspective mainly derives from the fact that the NHS Business Services
Authority was ‘established for the specific purpose of  meeting needs in the general
interest, not having an industrial or commercial character’ – as the other two conditions
are also clearly met. However, locating the contract under the CTSPs, or even under
SCCL (as the formal legal entity seemingly backing the NHS Supply Chain, in particular
after the expiry of  the service management agreement with DHL) would raise questions
as to the fit of  the NOM architecture under the CPB-based exemption from direct
compliance with the procurement rules. More importantly, given that the NOM
architecture is open to commercial exploitation for the benefit of  non-NHS and even
private organisations, the ‘non-commercial’ nature of  the NOM system may be open to
future challenges (as well as triggering competition law concerns, see below).
It seems that there is a converging interest in (legally) locating all NOM contracts
under the legal personality of  the NHS Business Services Authority – despite the fact that
the latter seems to have made great efforts to distance itself  from the direct management
of  the NOM, most recently through the creation of  SCCL. However, for this not to limit
third-party rights and interests and to avoid generating risks of  non-compliance with the
applicable procurement rules, it seems necessary that: (i) any and all acts and decisions
involved in the operation of  the NOM – including those of  private entities and, in
particular, CTSPs – are attributable to the NHS Business Services Authority for the
purposes of  legal challenge and judicial review (as discussed above); and (ii) that the
commercial exploitation of  the NOM for the benefit of  non-NHS and even private
organisations is either significantly constrained or, preferably, completely excluded. This
would, in practice, resolve some of  the issues discussed so far through the simple (legal
fiction and) solution of  assigning all ‘NOM activity’ to the NHS Business Services
Authority for the purposes of  accountability, reviewability and legal compliance.
However, even if  these two issues are galvanised in the operation, governance and
accountability of  the NOM, there would still be additional challenges in ensuring
adequate legal compliance with other aspects of  procurement and competition law.
PARTICULAR CHALLENGES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
A challenge that may seem difficult to resolve concerns the identification, prevention and
management of  conflicts of  interest within NOM. One of  the innovations of  the
PCR2015 was the transposition into the UK system73 of  new EU requirements for the
prevention of  conflicts of  interest. Regulation 24 PCR2015 is clear in demanding that
contracting authorities ‘take appropriate measures to effectively prevent, identify and
remedy conflicts of  interest arising in the conduct of  procurement procedures so as to
avoid any distortion of  competition and to ensure equal treatment of  all economic
operators’. In the context of  NOM, given that contracts are being advertised as tendered
by the DHL (or the CTSP in the future) ‘acting on behalf  of  Supply Chain Coordination
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Ltd acting on behalf  of  the NHS Business Services Authority’, this requires measures to
ensure that the CTSPs are within the scope of  this rule. Given that CTSPs will be the
ones establishing procurement strategy and, most likely, drafting procurement documents,
a narrow interpretation of  the scope of  application of  the rules on conflict of  interest as
only applicable to the formal contracting authority (the NHS Business Services Authority)
would be undesirable – and possibly subject to challenge.74 CTSPs must thus be under a
strict obligation to take measures to prevent, identify and remedy conflicts of  interest.
In a mirror image, reg 57(8)(e) PCR2015 allows the contracting authority to exclude
economic operators ‘where a conflict of  interest within the meaning of  regulation 24
cannot be effectively remedied by other, less intrusive, measures’. This provision is
intended as a residual clause whereby situations where the contracting authority cannot
take internal measures to resolve a conflict of  interest (e.g. the substitution of  individual
members of  the evaluation team affected by a conflict of  interest) can be resolved
through the exclusion of  the economic operator concerned. This seems more difficult to
interpret where the conflict of  interest is not between the contracting authority (the NHS
Business Services Authority) and the potential provider, but rather between the CTSP and
the potential provider (e.g. if  they have common business interests), as the contracting
authority cannot take effective internal measures.
The peculiarities of  the potential conflicts of  interest in the context of  NOM suggest
that there is a need for careful analysis and, potentially, for explicit guidance to be
adopted. Given the existence of  rather detailed NHS England statutory guidance on
managing conflicts of  interest for clinical commissioning groups,75 that would seem like
a good starting point.
APPLICABILITY OF COMPETITION LAW TO NHS SUPPLY CHAIN AND THE NOM
Another difficulty arising from the structure of  the NOM concerns the assessment of  the
extent to which the activities of  the different operators are subjected to competition law
scrutiny – which is a rather fundamental check and balance for market-based governance
mechanisms. An exhaustive analysis of  this issue would exceed the possibilities of  this
paper. However, there are two salient issues that require particular attention. First, the
extent to which competition law is applicable to the NOM as a sui generis CPB. Second,
whether the NOM structure creates risks of  violation of  competition law standards, in
particular concerning the exchange of  competition-sensitive information.
The first issue is important because the NOM, by aggregating and exercising public
buying power, seems particularly prone to potential claims of  anticompetitive behaviour
– and, in particular, of  exclusionary and/or abusive behaviour against the interests of
(potential) NHS suppliers. In that regard, the received wisdom is that entities that are
engaged in procurement activities are shielded from the application of  competition law,
unless they also engage in downstream competitive markets. Or, in other words, that
competition law does not apply to the procurement activity in itself. This is the result of
case law of  the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU)76 that reversed the
previous domestic position of  the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) that
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competition law and its prohibitions applied to any entities which behaviour generated the
effects that competition law sought to prevent, including in the context of  their
procurement activities.77
This could be seen as an exemption from the competition law prohibitions for the
procurement activities covered by the NOM. However, it is worth noting that the CJEU
case law did not exclude the possibility of  applying competition law to entities that engage
in procurement as an economic activity.78 In that regard, the applicability of  the prohibitions in
the Competition Act 1998 (CA1998)79 and Articles 101 and 102 of  the Treaty on the
Functioning of  the EU (TFEU) to the NOM is not out of  the question. To the contrary,
it is submitted that the NOM and, in particular, NHS Supply Chain (as a front entity
jointly run by the relevant CTSP, SCCL and the NHS Business Services Authority) is
subject to competition law. Indeed, to the extent that the NOM is premised on the
existence of  commercial activity (both in the generation of  savings and their split
between the CTSPs and the NHS Business Services Authority) and is not a ‘closed-
system’, but rather susceptible to commercial exploitation through the participation of
non-NHS and private organisations, by design, it represents the carrying out of  an
economic activity that triggers the applicability of  competition law.
Independently from the above, and even if  the NOM was not seen as itself subject to
competition law, the second issue it raises from a competition law perspective concerns a
risk of  potential illegal exchanges of  information in violation of  the prohibition in
Chapter I CA1998 and Article 101 TFEU – or, at the very least, a heightened risk of
collusion in NHS procurement markets. The need to ensure confidentiality of  purchasing
prices has been a primary concern of  the NHS Business Services Authority’s Scorpio
Price Benchmarking project,80 which pledged to its participants to keep information
confidential and to not share it with NHS Supply Chain. Indeed, the need to keep price
information confidential and to prevent its dissemination in the market is aligned with
competition law requirements, which oppose competitors’ access to commercially
sensitive information. However, the extent to which sensitive price information will be
used in a competition law-compliant manner under NOM raises some questions. Indeed,
one of  the mechanisms underpinning the NOM is the development and further use of
the purchase price index and benchmarking tool, as well as other price-monitoring tools
required to set baseline prices and assess the generation of  savings (especially by CTSPs).
In that regard, the creation of  databases of  prices should be accompanied by adequate
competition safeguards.
Amongst others, these issues seem relevant enough for the Competition and Markets
Authority (CMA) to take an interest in any complaint concerning the functioning of  the
NOM and for it to keep a close eye on the potential emergence of  competition problems.
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Even if  NHS Improvement is co-competent for the enforcement of  competition law,81
given the proximity of  entities within the ‘NHS family’ and the strategic interests of  the
Department of  Health and Social Care in the NOM, this seems a clear case where
independent CMA involvement could generate better outcomes than a softer
(self)regulatory approach by NHS Improvement.
Conclusion
This paper has explored the fit of  the NOM within the broader context of  efficiency-
driven NHS re-regulation, and its potential to unlock funds to support the delivery of
current aspirations for the transformation of  the NHS through STPs. It has explored the
legal and business structure of  the NOM and assessed the strategic, governance and legal
compliance challenges it presents. The paper has suggested that, in order to address such
challenges, it is necessary to functionally disregard the multiple layers of  contractualised
management of  the NHS supply chain and proceed to effectively locate all relevant NOM
relationships, including those resulting from CTSP activity, under the NHS Business
Services Authority for the purposes of  their judicial review and their subjection to
procurement law. The paper has also identified the need for explicit guidance on the
management of  conflicts of  interest with the NOM and for independent oversight by the
CMA of  the potential anticompetitive effects of  the exercise of  buying power on which
the NOM rests, as well as of  the potentially excessive exchange of  commercially sensitive
information. Only if  these checks and balances are made effective will the operation of
the NOM be subjected to effective oversight.
Centralisation of procurement and supply chain management 75
81   See the memorandum of  understanding between the Competition and Markets Authority and NHS
Improvement (1 April 2016) <https://improvement.nhs.uk/documents/29/NHS_Improvement_and_
CMA_MoU_-_010416.pdf>. For discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Monitor and the Competition and
Markets Authority’ (University of  Leicester School of  Law Research Papers No 14 2014)
<https://lra.le.ac.uk/handle/2381/29333>.

